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Biology is Not Destiny: Biological
Fathers’ Rights to their Newborn
Children Born Out of Wedlock in
Georgia*
I. INTRODUCTION
Leonardo da Vinci, William the Conqueror, Alexander Hamilton, Jon
Snow. The common denominator between these seemingly random
individuals is that they are all known for being “bastard children.”1
Everyone who followed the popular television series, Game of Thrones,
knows Jon Snow was erroneously recognized as the bastard son of his
“father,” Ned Stark.2 Actually, “Snow” was the show’s universal last
name for all bastard children.3 Likewise, anyone who has seen
Hamilton: An American Musical knows Alexander Hamilton was a
bastard son who was able to defy the odds and become a founding father

* To my faculty advisor, Professor Karen Sneddon, thank you for your substantial
guidance throughout this writing process. To my family and Ryan, I am forever grateful
for your constant love and support in everything I do.
1 See WALTER ISAACSON, LEONARDO DA VINCI xi–xii, 11 (2017) (Leonardo da
Vinci was born in 1452 and was the illegitimate son of his mother Caterina, a peasant
orphan and his notary father, Piero da Vinci); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1956) (William the Conqueror was also
known as “William the Bastard” and became King of England in 1066); Alexander
Hamilton
(1755-1804),
a
Profile,
PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/profile-alexander-hamilton-17551804/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021) (Alexander Hamilton was born in the West Indies in
1755 and was orphaned at thirteen years old when his mother died); Game of Thrones
Wiki: Jon Snow, https://gameofthrones.fandom.com/wiki/Jon_Snow (last visited Jan. 24,
2021)(Jon Snow is the son of Lyanna Stark and Rhaegar Targaryen but was known and
raised as the bastard son of Lyanna’s brother, Ned Stark).
2 Game of Thrones Wiki: Jon Snow, https://gameofthrones.fandom.com/wiki/Jon_Snow
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (Jon Snow was raised as a bastard son to protect him, but was
actually the last rightful heir to the Iron Throne).
3 Id.
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of the United States.4 Bastard children are routinely thought of and
portrayed in both history and literature as an “underdog” who had to
rise above their misfortunate and disdainful status of illegitimacy.
Today, children born out of wedlock are no longer referred to as
“bastards,” but many would be surprised that distinctions in laws
remain between children born outside of a marriage and their parents.
Perhaps the most shocking law in today’s day and age is that fathers
are not guaranteed an automatic right to their children based on their
biological connection. Instead, only biological mothers have all rights
and custody to their children. Fathers who are married to the mother
are given automatic rights to their children because of their marriage.
But, biological fathers who are not married to their child’s mother have
to jump through certain hoops to have any rights or custody of their
children—and those biological fathers may not even be aware of the
obstacles they face.
So, for example, in Georgia, a mother could unilaterally put her
newborn child up for adoption against the wishes of the unmarried
biological father.5 Just this year, in 2020, an unmarried biological
father in Georgia immediately filed a petition for rights to his newborn
child. The mother gave the child up for adoption—the biological father’s
petition was denied, and the adoption was finalized.6 The decision was
appealed all the way to the Georgia Supreme Court which upheld the
trial court’s decision.7 Although a biological father may undertake
certain steps to prevent the adoption from proceeding, the ability of the
biological mother to unilaterally proceed is a chilly reminder that
“biology is not destiny.”8
This Comment argues the unconstitutionality of Georgia’s laws
concerning unmarried biological fathers’ rights to their children could
be successfully challenged in the near future, specifically in relation to
the unmarried biological father’s inability to object to the adoption of
his newborn child based on his biological connection to his child alone.
Part II of the comment summarizes the historical importance of
marriage in the United States and how marriage has shaped the rights
of parents to their children. Part III examines relevant Supreme Court

4 LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL, Alexander Hamilton
(Atlantic Records, 2015).
5 O.C.G.A. § 19-8-4 (2020) (consent of parents needed for adoption); O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22
(2020) (biological father differentiated from legal father). See also Mathenia v.
Brumbelow, 308 Ga. 714, 716–18, 843 S.E.2d 582, 584, 585–86 (2020).
6 Mathenia, 308 Ga. at 716–18, 843 S.E.2d at 585–86.
7 Id. at 726, 843 S.E.2d at 592.
8 Park v. Bailey, 329 Ga. App. 569, 575, 765 S.E.2d 721, 726 (2014).
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of the United States precedent regarding unmarried biological fathers’
rights that have provided a baseline for states to develop their laws.
The current Supreme Court precedent is easily contrasted with the
corresponding Supreme Court dissents of Part IV that take a more
liberal approach to unmarried fathers’ rights. Part VI analyzes
Georgia’s current statutes and case law surrounding unmarried
biological fathers’ rights to their children, specifically in relation to
newborn adoption. Finally, Part VII suggests that Georgia’s laws
surrounding unmarried biological fathers’ rights to their newborn
children are unconstitutional, and if the United States Supreme Court
were to analyze unmarried biological fathers’ rights again in today’s
time, it is probable that unmarried biological fathers would receive
stronger constitutional protection.
II. MARRIAGE HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE
Marriage is, and always has been, a basic social and legal institution
of our society. Not surprisingly, the law surrounding legitimation stems
from the public policy and the history of society favoring marriage.
Religious and societal views on morality encouraged the idea of a
“traditional family” that consisted of a father, mother, and child.9
“Moral laws,” such as crimes against adultery, fornication, cohabitation,
seduction, and bastardy, all promoted marriage.10 By the end of the
twentieth century, society’s attitudes and behavior sparked change.
Laws governing sexual relations began to be repealed.11 Society placed
less emphasis on the traditional family, cohabitation began to increase
dramatically, and people accepted the idea that all families are
different.12
Still, marriage remains an important part of our society, and there is
a long history of the United States Supreme Court emphasizing the
importance of a traditional family, which obviously begins with
marriage.13 The Supreme Court has held that the traditional family
unit receives protection from the Constitution through the Equal
Protection Clause, Due Process clause, and Ninth Amendment.14 To
illustrate the reasons for the preference toward marriage, in 1965, with

9 JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTEL: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 3 (Chuck Meyers ed., 2011) (ebook).
10 Id. at 109.
11 Id. at 111.
12 Id. at 5, 111.
13 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1983).
14 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,15 the Supreme Court
described marriage as “a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. . . . [I]t
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.”16 Over the years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly deemed
marriage a fundamental right.17
A. Marriage and Children
When two married people have a child, the married couple has all
legal rights to the child.18 Before science allowed for DNA testing,
marriage was the only way to ascertain who the father of the child was,
even if the husband was not actually the biological father. An American
adage summarized this dilemma as “mother's baby, father's maybe.”19
Being married is not only a status, but also thought of as a
contractual relationship that gives obligations to the husband and wife
and to their children.20 Historically, marriage “effectively barred either
spouse from testifying that the husband was not the child’s father,” and
the husband’s paternity to the child was “virtually irrebuttable” except
in rare instances such as proof of sterility or impotence.21 The husband
had all legal rights to the child purely by being married to the child’s
mother.22 This marital presumption still exists today in almost every
state.23
In the limited instances that children were born to married parents
who later divorced, historically, English common law gave husbands all
custody rights to the child.24 This allocation of custody rights was
consistent with other rights given to husbands and not wives, such as
the right to buy and sell property.25 In response to the women’s rights
movement, in 1873, the scale tipped almost completely in the opposite
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 486.
17 See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
18 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (2020). See also, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
124 (1989) (plurality opinion).
19 Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 29, 47, n. 77 (2003).
20 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663 (Burger J., dissenting).
21 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS & LINDA C. MCCLAIN,
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 305 (West Academic Publishing, 5th ed. 2020).
22 INSIDE THE CASTEL, supra note 9, at 287.
23 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra note 21 at 306.
24 INSIDE THE CASTEL, supra note 9, at 3–4.
25 Id.
15
16
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direction with the Tender Years Doctrine.26 The United States adopted
the doctrine from England which stipulated that a mother should be
awarded custody of a child if he or she was under seven years old—in
his or her “tender years.”27 This doctrine reflected the distinct gender
roles placed upon men and women and society and promoted the stigma
against fathers caring for their children.28
B. History of Non-Marital Children
At common law, a child born out of wedlock, or a nonmarital child,
was referred to as filius nullius—the child of nobody.29 Being a child of
no one had a range of consequences, both socially and legally. For
example, the nonmarital child could not inherit from either biological
parent.30 Illegitimate children were not even recognized under the law
as part of the family until the end of the nineteenth century.31 English
common law and early American law gave no legal relationship rights
to nonmarital children or the parents of nonmarital children—even the
mothers.32 Therefore, not surprisingly, illegitimacy was an avoided
status and before birth control methods were developed, abstinence or
marriage were the only ways to avoid having an illegitimate child.
Public policy promoted marriage to prevent children from suffering
from the status and stigma that illegitimacy brought. An unwed mother
was thought to be disgraceful for having sexual relations outside of
marriage, and the child was thought to be a product of that disgrace.33
As recently as 1979, the Supreme Court characterized being born out of
wedlock as a “formidable handicap” because the child would “suffer the
myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy
brings.”34 This characterization was based on a prior study that showed
illegitimate children were more prone to medical, emotional,
educational, and economic issues.35
The Custody of Infants Act 1873; INSIDE THE CASTEL, supra note 9, at 215–16.
INSIDE THE CASTEL, supra note 9, at 215–16. Since then, the Tender Tears Doctrine
has been gradually replaced by the best interest of the child standard.
28 Id. at 214–215.
29 Id. at 238.
30 Id.
31 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra note 21 at 306.
32 Id.; Although, there were “bastardy laws” dating back to the seventeenth century
that gave a financial obligation to the father to prevent the child from being a public
burden, but they only gave responsibilities to the fathers, not any rights. INSIDE THE
CASTEL, supra note 9, at 287.
33 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968) (Douglas J., concurring).
34 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 75.
35 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n. 25.
26
27
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Similar to the stigma against nonmarital children, unmarried
fathers, as a class, were generalized and lumped together. In 1972, it
was not frowned upon to argue to the Supreme Court that all unwed
fathers are “unsuitable and neglectful parents.”36 Even Chief Justice
Berger echoed this sentiment when he stated that “centuries of human
experience” support that unwed fathers “rarely burden the mother or
child with their attentions or loyalties.”37 It was also argued that “a
natural mother . . . bears a closer relationship with her child . . . than a
father does.”38 And in 1975, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned
that the consent of unwed fathers in adoptions should not be needed
because it would cause the “cruel and undeserved out-of-wedlock
stigma” to continue for the children.39 Needless to say, the status of
illegitimacy was considered a genuine concern sought to be addressed
by the society and the law.
The simplest solution to ensure biological fathers’ rights were
protected was to encourage them to marry the mother.40 If a father
chose not to marry the mother it would be held against him by showing
a lack of interest in the child.41 For example, in 1983, the Supreme
Court stated the father did not show a full commitment to his fatherly
responsibility and one of its reasonings was that the father “never
offered to marry” the mother.42 Obviously, this “fix” did not address
situations where either the mother or biological father were already
married to someone else or where they two simply expressed no desire
to be married.
Currently, virtually no legal distinction exists between children born
to married parents or unmarried parents once parentage is
established.43 The issue for nonmarried biological fathers becomes
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
Id. at 666 (Burger J., dissenting) Justice Burger opined that the general rule of
thumb that unwed fathers are unfit parents should allow for the law to stand because it is
about the well-being of the illegitimate children and not about the fathers.
38 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979).
39 In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 572, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1975).
40 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252, 263 (stating “the most effective protection” of a biological
father’s rights is marriage).
41 Id. at 252.
42 Id. Other reasons included that he did not live with the mother or child after the
birth or offer financial support.
43 After a series of cases in the Supreme Court stipulated that unequal treatment of
nonmarital children and marital children was unconstitutional, the Uniform Parentage
Act reaffirmed the equality for all children regardless of their parent’s marital status in
1973. Uniform Parentage Act § 2 (1973). See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(holding illegitimate children were entitled to wrongful death recovery of their parents);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (holding a statute was in violation of
36
37
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establishing their parentage. The treatment of nonmarital children has
improved significantly, but legal differentiations continue to linger
between married and unmarried biological fathers’ rights to their
children. So, while the use of “bastard” is no longer appropriate, laws
surrounding legitimation further the notion that children can still be
“illegitimate.”44
Actually, in Georgia, before an unwed biological father has any legal
rights to the child, the father must first literally file a legitimation
petition.45 Georgia’s legitimation laws are seemingly built in accordance
with United States Supreme Court decisions concerning unwed
biological fathers’ rights to parent their children. Yet, upon further
examination of Supreme Court precedent, Georgia’s case law may have
drifted away from what the Supreme Court intended for unmarried
biological fathers’ rights to their children.
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS ON UNWED
BIOLOGICAL FATHERS’ RIGHTS
The United States Supreme Court has deemed a parent’s right to the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her own
children a fundamental right.46 Fundamental rights are protected by
both the Equal Protection Clause47 of the 14th Amendment and the Due
Process Clauses48 of the 5th and 14th Amendments.49 Because not all
fundamental rights are named explicitly in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has deemed most rights fundamental if they are “deeply

equal protection where illegitimate children were not entitled to workers compensation);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (holding a statute was in violation of equal
protection where illegitimate children were not entitled to certain government benefits);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding illegitimate children were entitled to
inherit from both their mother and father). See also Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing
Parenthood Through the UPA (2017) 127 YALE L.J. Forum 589, 598 n.55 (2018); Camille
Workman, The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act: A Response to the Changing Definition of
Family?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 233, 235 (2019).
44 See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 394 n.15 (2011) “in so far as
the law perpetuates the status of legitimacy it must by definition also be maintaining a
concomitant status of illegitimacy” (quoting Andrew Bainham, Is Legitimacy Legitimate?,
39 FAM. LAW 673, 673 (2009)).
45 O.C.G.A § 19-7-22(a)(2)(d) (2020).
46 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
47 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
48 U.S. Const. amend. V.
49 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
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rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”50 While true, finding
fundamental rights in tradition and history is not absolute, as the
Supreme Court has recognized rights in accordance with the changing
times, such as same-sex marriage.51
So, although the Supreme Court has deemed parental rights
fundamental, the rights to one’s children are only absolute as it relates
to married parents and mothers.52 Unmarried biological fathers, on the
other hand, have only the opportunity to develop the fundamental
right.53
The Supreme Court first analyzed the rights of unwed fathers in the
1970s.54 The common theme throughout is that the Court sought to
“save” the children from this stigma of illegitimacy by preferring
children to be raised in “normal, two parent” families.55
A. Four Cases Building On Each Other
The Supreme Court examined unwed fathers’ parental rights for the
first time in 1972 with the case of Stanley v. Illinois.56 The Supreme
Court analyzed a law that indicated unmarried fathers were not
allowed to raise their children upon the death of the mother.57 State law
presumed unmarried fathers were unfit; and therefore, the state took
unwed fathers’ children from them without a hearing on parental
fitness. Married fathers and all mothers, on the other hand, were
presumed fit; and the State only took the children after a hearing on
parental fitness. The decision in Stanley actually proved to be a turning
point in the country. The Illinois law was found unconstitutional as a
violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.58 The Court

U.S. Const. amend. IX (non-enumerated rights); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 645. “History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry
but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.”
52 See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246; Caban, 441 U.S. 380; Lehr, 463
U.S. 248.
53 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
54 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
55 Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
56 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
57 Id. at 646. The Illinois law differentiated between unmarried fathers and fathers
who were married, divorced, or widowed.
58Id. at 658 (holding the states interest of protecting children from unfit parents is
legitimate, but its means of achieving that interest with respect to unmarried fathers is
not).
50
51
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laid the foundation for the Quilloin v. Walcatt59 which made its way to
the Supreme Court just five years later.
Quilloin was a Georgia case that further examined unmarried
biological fathers’ rights in 1977.60 In Quilloin, a mother remarried, and
the mother’s new husband filed to adopt her eleven-year-old child. For
unmarried parents, the law only required the mother’s consent to the
adoption. The biological father’s attempt to legitimate his son failed and
the adoption with the new husband was granted because it was in the
child’s best interest.61 The Court in Quilloin used Stanley as precedent,
but the Court stated Stanley “left unresolved the degree of protection a
State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation . . . in
which the countervailing interests are more substantial.”62 The
countervailing interests being the importance of placing the child in a
“family unit” which trumped the unmarried father’s right to his child.63
The Court explained,
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest.’64

The main takeaway from Quilloin proved to be that the father never
acted like a parent to the child by having “responsibility with respect to
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”65 So,
the Court’s decision was based on the father’s lack of a relationship
with the child.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246.
Id.
61 Id. at 247–52.
62 Id. at 248.
63 Id. at 255. The court found Due Process was not violated because the states purpose
of placing the child in a family unit was greater than the biological father’s right to his
child. The biological father did not properly raise an equal protection claim against the
treatment of unwed parents according to gender and instead focused the claim on his
particular circumstances. The court reasoned equal protection was not violated in this
case because he never had actual or legal custody off the child like a married or divorced
father would have and therefor “never shouldered any significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.” The court
emphasized that the father never complained of not having these responsibilities and that
he did not seek custody of his child. Although, he did seek visitation and file for
legitimation. Id. at 256.
64 Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–863
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 256; Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
59
60
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Two years later, in 1979, Caban v. Mohammed66 was decided and
involved a similar statute to Quilloin, which granted a veto to adopt
from both the mother and the father if the couple were married, but
only veto power to the mother if the couple were not married.67 The
Court held the statute was a violation of Equal Protection because the
statute made an “overbroad generalization” of unwed fathers.68 The
resolution of the case ultimately turned on the fact that the mother and
father had similar relationships with the four and six-year old
children.69 The Court differentiated this case from Quilloin because in
Caban the father acted like a parent to his child.70 Therefore, the
father’s relationship with the child was again emphasized by the Court.
The Court also highlighted that this situation was different than
situations where a parent abandons the child by not “coming forward to
participate in the rearing of his child.”71 It emphasized that when an
unwed father abandons the child then the adoption can proceed without
consent from that parent.72
Then, in 1983, in Lehr v. Robertson,73 the Court used Stanley, Caban,
and Quilloin to emphasize that an unwed father must participate in the
child’s life to have Constitutional protection and that a purely biological
connection is not enough.74 Lehr held an unwed father did not have an
absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
adoption of his two-year old child.75 The New York law gave only certain
classes of unwed biological fathers notice of adoption proceedings.76 The
Court highlighted that a biological connection is not enough to give
rights to a father, and the father must “grasp the opportunity” to
develop a parent-child relationship in order to “enjoy the blessings of

Caban, 441 U.S. 380.
Id. at 385–87.
68 Id. at 394.
69 Id. at 389.
70 Id. at 389 n.7.
71 Id. at 392.
72 Id. at 392 n. 11.
73 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248.
74 Id. at 258–62.
75 Id. at 249–50. The father lived with the mother for a time before the birth of the
child, visited the child at the birth, but did not offer financial support or offer to marry the
mother. Id. at 252.
76 Id. at 251. The classes of fathers entitled to notice included fathers listed on the
putative father registry, fathers adjudicated to be the father, fathers listed on the child’s
birth certificate, fathers who lived openly with the mother and child and held themselves
out as the father, fathers identified in a sworn written statement by the mother, and
fathers that were married to the mother within the first six months of the child’s birth.
66
67
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the parent-child relationship.”77 The Court stated that “[t]he actions of
judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds” and implied that it is the
fathers who do so.78 It was also stressed, “[t]he significance of the
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring.”79
With these cases, the Supreme Court created a unifying theme that
an unwed father’s biological connection alone does not create a
constitutionally protected interest to his child.80 But, a biological
connection plus the grasping of the opportunity to act as a parent
toward the child would be enough to establish Constitutional protection.
Therefore, at least, the unwed biological fathers have a Constitutionally
protected interest in the opportunity to develop a parent like
relationship with their child. This has been dubbed an “opportunity
interest.”81
B. Marital Presumption Supersedes Rights of Unwed Biological Father
A discussion on the history of unwed fathers’ rights would be
incomplete without an extended examination of the 1989 case of
Michael H. v. Gerald D.82 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
upheld a California law of a marital presumption which gave the
husband all rights to the child who was conceived during a mother’s
affair—instead of the biological father—simply because he was married
to the mother.83 Even though a D.N.A test showed the biological father,
Michael, was a 98% match as the biological father of the child, he had
no right to help raise or even visit the child.84 Michael had also lived
with the child, supported the child, the child called him “Daddy,” and
“from the beginning” has tried to have a relationship with the child.85
Nonetheless, the plurality stressed that there was no protection for an

Id. at 262.
Id. at 261.
79 Id. at 262.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Mathenia, 308 Ga. 714, 843 S.E.2d 582.
82 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
83 Id. at 131–32.
84 Id. at 114.
85 Id. at 143–44 (Brennan J., dissenting).
77
78
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unwed biological under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
because it is historical practice to encourage traditional family units.86
Michael argued that Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr held that a
biological connection “plus an established parental relationship” created
a Constitutional protection for an unwed father.87 The Court
disregarded the holdings of Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr and
somehow came to the confusing conclusion that those cases were about
the “historic respect” for the “sanctity” to the relationships in a
traditional family unit.88
The Court then went on to hold that an unwed biological father and
his child have no history of being a protected family unit and it would
be “impossible” to say otherwise.89 Instead, the Court emphasized
society’s tradition and history of marriage and there was not any
precedent that gave unwed fathers rights to a child born into an
existing marriage.90
And thus, the Supreme Court came to the seemingly absurd
conclusion that ensuring a child was raised within a marriage was more
important than an unmarried biological father’s connection to his child.
C. Unwed Fathers’ Rights in Newborn Adoption Concerning the ICWA
The Court did not examine unmarried biological fathers’ rights again
until more than twenty years later in 2013 when it granted certiorari
for the case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.91 The case involved the
adoption of a newborn child against the wishes of an unwed father, but
the case primarily concerned the biological father’s rights as they
related to statutory interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA)92 and not on equal protection or due process rights of the unwed
father.93 So, while the applicability of this case for future litigants is
limited, this case is the Supreme Court’s only examination concerning
unwed fathers’ rights as it relates to newborn adoption. The outcome of

86 Id. at 127. “Perhaps the concept can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear
no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships—and will thus cease to have any
constitutional significance.” Id. at 123 n.3.
87 Id. at 123.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 124.
90 Id. at 127.
91 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
92 The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–
1963.
93 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 641–42.
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the case is the most relevant takeaway for the discussion of unmarried
biological fathers’ rights.
In Adoptive Couple, the unwed biological father and biological
mother were engaged for a short time before she became pregnant.94
The biological father wanted to move up the date of the wedding and
refused to offer financial support to the pregnant mother until after the
wedding. The relationship soon ended, and the mother asked the father
either for child support or to terminate his parental rights—he chose to
terminate his parental rights. Therefore, the mother made adoptions
plans. The adoptive couple was emotionally and financially supportive
of the mother during the pregnancy and were even present during the
birth of the child. The baby was subsequently adopted by the couple,
and the biological father signed papers relinquishing his rights. The
issue was that the biological father allegedly did not realize he was
giving up his rights to the adoptive couple, and instead he thought he
was terminating his rights only with respect to the biological mother.95
The biological father contested the adoption and sought custody of
the child using the ICWA as his basis. The trial court in South Carolina
concluded the adoptive parents did not prove serious harm would come
from the biological father’s custody and because no remedial measures
were taken to prevent the breakup of the Indian family as required by
the ICWA.96 Therefore, the trial court denied the adoption. The
biological father was given custody of the 27-month-old child who he
had never met and who had lived with the adoptive parents her entire
life.97 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
denial of the adoption because the ICWA “confers conclusive custodial
preference to the Indian parent.”98 The case was appealed the United
States Supreme Court.99
Justice Alito authored the opinion for the majority of the court and
focused on the statutory interpretation of the statute “continued
custody” and “breakup” of a family.100 Using legislative history, the
purpose of the statute, and dictionary meanings he held that the

Id. at 643.
Id. at 643–45.
96 Id. at 645. The ICWA stipulated that a parent’s rights can only be involuntarily
terminated with evidence that “continued custody” will seriously harm the Indian child,
and there must be evidence that “remedial” efforts were taken to prevent the “breakup of
the Indian family.” Id. at 652.
97 Id. at 645.
98 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625, 657, 731 S.E.2d 550, 567 (2012).
99 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 646.
100 Id. at 641–42.
94
95
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provisions in the ICWA did not apply.101 He concluded that the
biological father never had custody of the child so there could not have
been “continued” custody.102 Likewise the biological father abandoned
the child before the birth so therefore there could not have been a
“breakup” of a family that was never intact.103 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the denial of the adoption petition.
Upon remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court, using the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ICWA, held that the
biological father’s parental rights were terminated and finalized the
adoptive couple’s adoption of the child.104
Although the litigation was surely emotionally taxing for all parties,
the child received perhaps the worst of it as she spent the first two
years of her life with the adoptive couple, eighteen months with the
biological father, and was then was returned back to the adoptive
parents at three and a half years old.105 So, although the case did not
give much, if any, substance to rights of unmarried fathers, it
undoubtedly shows the emotional toll and potential years of litigation
that can surround custody disputes.
D. The Only Other Mentions of Unwed Fathers’ Rights Concerning
Newborn Adoption
What would the Supreme Court hold as precedent if it actually
addressed head on whether an unmarried biological father’s right
concerning a newborn adoption? Adoptive Couple was more of a
statutory interpretation case and did not give substantive holdings
concerning unmarried biological fathers’ rights. But, one footnote in
Caban touched on the issue which stated simply that the issue was not
before them, so the court had “no view” on newborn adoptions and
whether it would require “more stringent requirements concerning the
acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter definition of
abandonment.”106 The only other analyses by the Court on newborn
adoption and fathers’ rights comes from the dissenting opinions of
Justice Stewart and Stevens in Caban. The two Justices went off on
somewhat of a tangent on the subject of newborn adoption, giving their
opinion on the unanswered quandary, since it was not relevant based

Id. at 649.
Id.
103 Id.
104 Adoptive Couple, 404 S.C. 483, 488, 746 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (2013).
105 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 692 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
106 Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 n.11.
101
102
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on the facts of the case.107 Both were of the opinion that mothers and
not unmarried biological fathers should make the choice of adoption for
their child.
Justice Stewart emphasized that there are “pragmatic differences”
that allow for unequal treatment of unwed fathers and mothers in the
context of newborn adoption.108 Justice Stewart stated that unwed
fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with newborn
adoption.109 To illustrate this, he highlights that the mother has a clear
relationship with the child because she carries the child, whereas the
“majority” of fathers are “unknown, unavailable, or simply
uninterested.”110 Justice Stewart believed that there was not sufficient
justification to invalidate a statute on the gender based classifications
in with the facts in Caban, but stated equal protection may be violated
if a statute allowed for the mother to “arbitrarily” make her own plans
for the child against the unmarried father’s wishes and the best interest
of the child.111 He also provided the caveat that the parties did not
argue that the consent of only one parent was constitutionally
defective.112
Likewise, Justice Stevens echoed these concerns and emphasizes
simply that men and women are different and these differences are
important.113 He stated that not only is the mother the one who carries
the child, but she has the sole right to decide if she even wants to carry
have the child in the first place.114 The mother is “inevitable[y]” the one
that will “constantly be faced with decisions on how best to care for the
child.”115 He also emphasized that the laws surrounding legitimacy
“gives the loving father an incentive to marry to mother.”116 For these
reasons, Justice Stevens found it “perfectly obvious” that these
differences justify the unequal treatment between unwed fathers and
mothers in the context of newborn adoption.117 He believed it should be
presumed laws that give custody to the mother are “entirely valid”

Id. at 394–417 (Stewart J., dissenting) (Stevens J., dissenting).
Id. at 399 (Stewart J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 398.
110 Id. at 399.
111 Id. at 401.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 404 (Stevens J., dissenting).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 406.
116 Id. at 407.
117 Id.
107
108
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unless the presumption proves serious often enough to render it invalid
under equal protection.118
These two dissents would give unmarried fathers a grim outlook on
their Constitutional rights involving the adoption of their newborn
children against their wishes. But, the following dissenting opinions in
many of the previously mentioned Supreme Court cases provide a more
encouraging position on unmarried fathers’ rights.
IV. THE OPINIONS OF TOMORROW: POSITIVE THOUGHTS ON
UNMARRIED FATHERS’ RIGHTS
In the words of Justice Ginsburg: “dissents speak to a future age . . .
the greatest dissents do become court opinions and gradually over time
their views become the dominant view. So that’s the dissenter’s hope:
that they are writing not for today, but for tomorrow.”119 Three heated
dissents in the cases of Lehr, Michael H., and Adoptive Couple are
worth mentioning for strong viewpoints in favor of unmarried fathers’
rights to their children.
A. Lehr Dissent
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in Lehr expressing that
unmarried fathers deserved more constitutional protection than the
majority gave, and Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joined.120
The dissent took issue with the fact that the majority emphasized
constitutional protection for unwed biological fathers only “in
appropriate cases.”121 Justice White concluded the majority’s denial of
the unwed biological father’s notice and opportunity to be heard before
the adoption of his child was a violation of due process.122 He stated
that it was not analyzing equal protection issues because it found the
decision in violation of due process rights.123
Justice White stressed that a biological father should have
constitutional protection because of the biological connection.124 He
stated the “usual” meaning of family is in fact a biological
relationship.125 Therefore, there should not be a finding of the “quality
Id. at 410.
NPR Interview by Nina Totenberg with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, PBS (May 3,
2002), https://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript116_full.html.
120 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268 (White J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 269.
122 Id. at 276.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 272.
125 Id.
118
119
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of the relationship but a simple determination of the fact that the
relationship exists.”126 The dissent highlighted that no notice was given
to the biological father even when his identity and location were known
to the state by filing a paternity action.127 Although, even when the
identity and location were not known to the state, the dissent indicated
the state should make a “reasonable effort” to find him and give him
notice.128 Finally, Justice White stated that no state interest is served
by denying the unwed biological father this constitutionally protected
interest.129 The state interests in expediting and finalizing adoption
proceedings were outweighed by the years of litigation surrounding the
adoption that denying the interest to unwed fathers upfront entails.130
The dissenting justices in Lehr reasoned that the biological father’s
rights should be tied to the child automatically based on the biology.131
Nevertheless, the majority’s holding on a father only having an
“opportunity” to develop a relationship with the child is the precedent
upon which states must base their laws.
B. Michael H. Dissent
In Michael H., Justice Brennan wrote a progressive dissenting
opinion that Justice Marshall and Blackmun joined in which he calls
the plurality opinion a “bad day for due process.”132 Brennan
emphasized that the majority of the court held that a marital
presumption overrides a natural father’s constitutionally protected
interest in a relationship with his child.133 He stated the “plurality
opinion's exclusively historical analysis portends a significant and
unfortunate departure from our prior cases and from sound
constitutional decision making.”134 Brennan criticized the plurality by
stating
It finds this limitation in “tradition.” Apparently oblivious to the fact
that this concept can be as malleable and as elusive as “liberty” itself,
the plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border
around the Constitution. The pretense is seductive; it would be
comforting to believe that a search for “tradition” involves nothing
Id.
Id. at 273.
128 Id. at 272.
129 Id. at 275.
130 Id. at 275–76.
131 Id. at 272.
132 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 146. (Brennan J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 157.
134 Id. at 137.
126
127
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more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through dusty volumes
on American history . . . Because reasonable people can disagree
about the content of particular traditions, and because they can
disagree even about which traditions are relevant to the definition of
“liberty.”135

Consequently, Brennan stated the courts need to “identify the point
at which a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our
definition of liberty and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to
be relevant any longer.”136 Brennan contended that tradition has not
been thought of so rigidly in the past, citing to a variety of rights that
were not traditionally protected.137 And so, unmarried biological fathers’
rights, he argued, should be protected now even though history has not
protected them in the past.138
Brennan emphasized that the “original reasons” for the marital
presumption are outdated because “blood tests can prove virtually
beyond a shadow of a doubt” who the father is and “illegitimacy no
longer plays the burdensome and stigmatizing role it once did.”139
Brennan went on to highlight that our society is not “assimilative” and
we have to be willing to accept liberties that may be “unfamiliar” and
that “times change.”140 He indicated that the plurality opinion is
especially concerning because the parent child relationship was one of
the first liberty interests the Supreme Court found to be protected by
the Constitution.141 He ended his dissent by avowing that “[w]hen and if
the Court awakes to reality, it will find a world very different from the
one it expects.”142
C. Adoptive Couple Dissent
In Adoptive Couple, Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined and Justice Scalia joined in part.143

Id.
Id. at 138.
137 Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (use of contraceptives for
unmarried couples); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (same for married couples); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (freedom from corporal punishment in schools); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (the freedom from an arbitrary transfer from a prison to a
psychiatric institution); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (right to raise illegitimate children)).
138 Id. at 141.
139 Id. at 140.
140 Id. at 141.
141 Id. at 142.
142 Id. at 157.
143 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S at 668 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
135
136
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The dissent primarily criticized the majority’s “hollow literalism” of the
interpretation of “custody” in the statute, and the dissent argued
instead that the ICWA protected continued parent child relationship.144
More than the facts of the case at hand, the dissent discussed unwed
biological fathers’ rights to a parent-child relationship.145
The dissent emphasized that the majority insinuates that Congress
could not have meant to require the termination of parental rights from
the biological father.146 Then, the dissent pointed out that plenty of
states give unwed biological fathers this protection.147 Some states, for
example, used the prior Supreme Court decisions to not require an
unwed biological father’s consent to adoption unless he has given
financial support during the pregnancy.148 Other states gave more
protection purely on the basis of the biological connection to the child.149
The dissent gave examples of fifteen states that actually give unwed
biological fathers this right upon an establishment of the biological
connection.150 Justice Sotomayor used these differences in state’s
legislature to argue that Congress intended the ICWA to protect all
biological parents, not just ones who had previous custody of the
child.151
Justice Sotomayor stressed that the biological father asserted his
parental rights “as soon as he learned of the impending adoption” when
the baby was only four months old and that if the applicable law of the
ICWA was followed before the baby was with the adoptive family for 27
months it would have saved all parties from some of the trauma the
case brought.152
These dissents reflect a more modern take on unwed biological
fathers’ rights and are helpful in foreshadowing how a Supreme Court
may analyze unwed fathers’ rights if the issue was properly presented
in the future.
V. GEORGIA LEGITIMATION PETITIONS OVERVIEW
With the Supreme Court’s constitutional holdings in mind, state laws
surrounding unwed fathers’ rights to their children have emerged.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 673.
146 Id. at 684.
147 Id. at 684–85.
148 Id. at 686–87.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 684.
151 Id. at 684–85.
152 Id. at 692.
144
145
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Biological fathers’ rights are especially relevant in regard to parental
consent for adoption, particularly in situations where the mother does
not support the biological father’s efforts to establish parentage. States
differentiate substantially on what is required to establish parentage
for unmarried biological fathers to require their consent for adoption.153
Virginia and Georgia provide stark examples of the different state
approaches. Virginia requires simply a genetic testing establishing the
biological connection to require the consent of an unwed biological
father for an adoption to take place.154 Georgia, on the other hand, only
requires the consent of an unwed biological father if he first legitimates
the child.155
Georgia’s legislation and case law regarding unwed biological fathers’
rights is clear: “biology is not destiny.”156 In Georgia, a mother is
entitled to custody and “all parental power over the child” unless and
until the child is legitimated by the father.157 Establishing paternity
only establishes the biological relationship between the father and
child.158 The biological father does not have rights unless he is also the
legal father.159 A father can obtain the status as the “legal father” in
four ways.160 But for an unmarried biological father, his only option is to
legitimate by filling a legitimation petition.161
The Georgia Supreme Court has used the decisions from the United
States Supreme Court cases to structure the granting of a legitimation
petition. First, it must be found that the unwed father has grasped his
“opportunity interest.”162 Second, it must be in the best interest of the

153 See Adoption Network, Adoption Consent Laws by State (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://adoptionnetwork.com/adoption-consent-laws-by-state.
154 See e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1202 (C); Va. Code Ann. § 20-49.1 (B)(1).
155 O.C.G.A. § 19-8-4; O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22.
156 Park, 329 Ga. App. at 575, 765 S.E.2d at 726.
157 O.C.G.A § 19-7-25 (West).
158 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(h).
159 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a)(1)–(2).
160 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a)(2).
(2) “Legal father” means a male who has not surrendered or had terminated
his rights to a child and who: (A) Has legally adopted such child; (B) Was
married to the biological mother of such child at the time such child was born
or within the usual period of gestation . . . (C) Married the legal mother of such
child after such child was born and recognized such child as his own, . . . or (D)
Has legitimated such child . . . .
161
O.C.G.A § 19-7-22(a)(2)(D). A father and mother can sign a voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-46.1(b), but this still only
establishes prima-facie evidence of paternity.
162 In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 296, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1987).
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child, or in particular cases the fit parent test is used.163 Both prongs
must be met for a legitimation petition to be granted. The granting of a
legitimation petition recognizes the biological father as the legal father
of the child and the father therefore assumes the responsibilities that
entails.164 So, how does an unwed biological father lose his opportunity
interest?
A. Opportunity Interest: How to Lose It
There have only been two cases by the Georgia Supreme Court
analyzing an unwed father’s opportunity interest. The first case was In
re Baby Girl Eason in 1987,165 and the latest being in May 18, 2020
with the case of Mathenia v. Brumbelow.166
Eason was Georgia’s first major analysis of unwed fathers’
constitutional interest in their children in light of Stanley, Caban,
Quilloin, and Lehr. Eason concerned an unwed father’s legitimation
petition of his child whom the mother unilaterally placed for
adoption.167 In Eason, the child was a product of a couple month
relationship between the biological father and the mother. When the
two learned of the pregnancy, they discussed abortion and adoption.
Before the child was born, the father moved from Georgia to California
for his job. There are many disputed facts concerning financial support
and the biological father’s expressed sentiments concerning custody or
adoption.168 Although the court did not scrutinize the facts because the
holding ultimately concerned whether to use the fitness of the parent
test or best interest of the child standard.169 The case was remanded to
determine whether the father had lost his opportunity interest.170
Thus, being the only Georgia Supreme Court case concerning
Georgia legitimation petitions, the court in Eason created principal
holdings that have been used in Georgia ever since. Eason held that an
163 Id. at 296–97. Eason held that the constitution requires the fit parent test to be
used to protect unwed biological fathers’ rights when state action is involved while the
best interest standard may be adequate for other situations. In 2016, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22
(d)(1) became effective which stipulates that a court may grant a legitimation petition
provided that it is “in the best interests of the child.” The Supreme Court doubted the
constitutionality of the statute in Mathenia. Mathenia, 308 Ga. 714, 724–26, 843 S.E.2d
582, 591 (2020).
164 Bowers v. Pearson, 271 Ga. App. 266, 271, 609 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2005).
165 Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459.
166 Mathenia, 308 Ga. 714, 843 S.E.2d 582.
167 Eason, 257 Ga. at 292, 358 S.E.2d at 459.
168 Id. at 292–93, 358 S.E.2d at 459–60.
169 Id. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463–64.
170 Id. at 298, 358, S.E.2d at 464.
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unwed father’s opportunity interest may be lost if it is not “timely
pursued.”171 Another holding that has proven to carry meaningful
weight in the context of newborn adoptions is that the opportunity
interest starts at conception and continues “probably” throughout the
child’s minority.172 Eason’s holdings were instrumental in the
development of case law concerning unwed fathers’ rights by the
Georgia Court of Appeals for the next 33 years.
Accordingly, the court of appeals has developed factors that are used
to determine whether a father has lost his opportunity interest. These
factors are, “without limitation, a biological father’s inaction during
pregnancy and at birth, a delay in filing a legitimation petition, and a
lack of contact with the child.”173 The trial court has the discretion to
weigh these factors with the father’s actions and inactions to determine
whether the father has abandoned his opportunity interest.174
B. Opportunity Interests in the Context of Newborn Adoption
The United States Supreme Court cases that substantively discussed
the rights of unwed fathers were centered around the father’s actual
relationship with the children because the children were old enough to
have a relationship with their father.175 So, as far as newborn adoption
goes, there is no Supreme Court precedent applicably discussing
unmarried biological fathers’ rights.176 Even Eason never analyzed the
facts to decide whether the father had lost his opportunity interest with
his newly born child that was put up for adoption. Therefore, the
Georgia Court of Appeals has set precedent on the issue. Although not
Id. at 296, 358 S.E.2d at 462.
Id.
173 Morris v. Morris, 309 Ga. App. 387, 389, 710 S.E.2d 603 (2011); In Interest of
D.S.P., 233 Ga. App. 346, 348, 504 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1998); Bowers, 271 Ga. App. at 271,
609 S.E.2d at 178. Actions and inactions include emotional and financial support for the
mother during pregnancy. In re J.L.E., 281 Ga. App. 805, 806, 637 S.E.2d 446, 448 (2006)
(quoting Eason, 257 Ga. at 296, 358 S.E.2d at 462). A delay in filing a legitimation
petition shows a father’s opportunity interest was not “timely pursued.” J.L.E., 281 Ga.
App. at 807, 637 S.E.2d at 448. Lack of contact with the child throughout the child’s life is
strong evidence of a father’s lack of interest in the child.
174 Mathenia, 208 Ga. at 715, 723 n.14, 843 S.E.2d at 584, 590 n.14.
175 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249 (the child was 11 years old); Caban, 441 U.S. at 389
(children were 4 and 6 years old); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250 (child was over two years old);
Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (the children were 2 1/2 and 6 months old and another child who
was 17 that was not involved in the proceeding) Brief for Petitioner at *4, Stanley, 405
U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014), 1971 WL 134140, at *4).
176 Adoptive Couple did involve a newborn adoption, but the case concerned statutory
interpretation of the ICWA and not Equal Protection or Due Process rights of unwed
fathers. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. 637.
171
172
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explicitly stated, in the context of newborn adoption, a biological
father’s inaction during pregnancy constitutes abandonment of the
opportunity interest.177 An unwed biological father’s rights to his child
depend entirely on the father’s actions during the pregnancy.178 Three
relevant Georgia Court of Appeals cases have examined a father’s loss
of opportunity interest during pregnancy: Turner v. Wright,179 In the
Interest of D.S.P.,180 and Bowers v. Pearson.181 These cases illustrate the
fact sensitive evaluations that trial courts must conduct to determine if
a father has lost his opportunity interest in his child.
In Turner v. Wright, in 1995, the trial court found that the father
committed crimes that he knew would ensure no relationship developed
with his child after he knew he was the father.182 The father did file for
a legitimation petition within a month after the child was born. But, the
trial court denied his legitimation petition because he committed
several crimes that led to his incarceration after he knew he was going
to be a father. The father even admitted that being incarcerated did not
allow him any money to support the mother or pursue any relationship
with the child.183 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the
legitimation petition and held the father blatantly disregarded his
opportunity interest by committing these crimes.184
With the case of In the Interest of D.S.P., in 1998, the biological
father and mother had just started dating when she became pregnant,
and both unsuccessfully tried to “work things out” after learning of the
pregnancy.185 The mother eventually told the biological father that
there were three other potential fathers, and therefore the biological
father wanted a blood test to which the mother refused to cooperate.
The trial court found it was undisputed that the father knew of the
mother’s intention to put the child up for adoption.186 No other contact
between the father and the mother occurred until two months after the
birth. The trial court found that even though the father knew of the
intentions to put the child up for adoption, he did nothing until two
177 Bowers, 271 Ga. App. 266, 609 S.E.2d 174; D.S.P., 233 Ga. App. 346, 504 S.E.2d
211; Turner v. Wright, 217 Ga. App. 368, 457 S.E.2d 575 (1995).
178 Mathenia, 208 Ga. at 721–22, 843 S.E.2d at 588–89.
179 Turner, 217 Ga. App. 368, 457 S.E.2d 575.
180 D.S.P., 233 Ga. App. 346, 504 S.E.2d 211.
181 Bowers, 271 Ga. App. 266, 609 S.E.2d 174.
182 Turner, 217 Ga. App. at 369, 457 S.E.2d at 576.
183Id. at 369–70, 457 S.E.2d at 576–77 (holding the biological father was also an unfit
because he spent the last 11 years “on probation, on parole, or in jail or prison”).
184 Id.
185 D.S.P., 233 Ga. App. at 346, 504 S.E.2d at 212.
186 Id. at 346–47, 504 S.E.2d at 212.
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months after the child’s birth.187 Also, the father did not offer financial
support even though the mother needed it. The court of appeals
affirmed the denial of the father’s legitimation petition because of his
failure to grasp his opportunity interest during pregnancy and the two
months after birth.188
Then, most recently in 2005, in Bowers, the biological mother and
father were in a relationship when she became pregnant.189 The couple
split up sometime during the pregnancy and the biological father filed
for legitimation a month before the child was born. But, the mother
unilaterally gave the child up for adoption. The trial court denied the
legitimation petition because he did not “provide financial or other
support to Pearson during her pregnancy.”190 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that the mother did not want contact or input from the
father and therefore she did not seek any financial assistance from him.
The mother’s father even admitted that communication with the
biological father would be “counterproductive in the adoption.”191
Additionally, the court held that by filing a legitimation petition, the
father was signing up for all the legal responsibilities of the child. For
these reasons, the court of appeals held that the biological father did
not abandon his opportunity interest and reversed the trial court’s
denial of the petition.192
Fifteen years after Bowers, Mathenia v. Brumbelow was decided by
the Georgia Supreme Court on May 18, 2020. Mathenia was the first
examination of legitimation petitions by the Georgia Supreme Court
since Eason. Mathenia involved many modern-day issues concerning
unmarried biological fathers’ rights.
VI. BRUMBELOW V. MATHENIA: A LOST OPPORTUNITY THAT
NEVER EXISTED
The nuanced facts of Mathenia are instrumental in the analysis of
the father’s petition for legitimation. In Mathenia, Mathenia became
pregnant after a one-night stand with Brumbelow while Mathenia was
married to another man.193 Brumbelow and Mathenia briefly discussed
raising the child together. But, soon Mathenia was “mean” to

Id. at 348, 504 S.E.2d at 213.
Id. at 349, 504 S.E.2d at 213–14.
189 Bowers, 271 Ga. App. 266–67, 609 S.E.2d 175.
190 Id. at 266, 609 S.E.2d at 174.
191 Id. at 271, 609 S.E.2d at 178.
192 Id.
193 Mathenia, 208 Ga. at 716–17, 843 S.E.2d at 585.
187
188
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Brumbelow because she “didn’t want a kid with him.”194 Mathenia was
still married to another man, but she was upset that Brumbelow
questioned the paternity of the child, and therefore she cussed
Brumbelow out. Brumbelow attended a doctor’s appointment with Ms.
Mathenia during her pregnancy so that he could “do the math” to see if
he was the father.195 Brumbelow offered to pay for an abortion “if she
wanted one,” which she decided she did not.196 Mathenia eventually
decided she did not want Brumbelow to contact her during her
pregnancy, so she “cut off all contact” with him and blocked him on
Facebook.197 “As a result, during the entirety of Mathenia's pregnancy,
Brumbelow never asked about her well-being or if she needed
anything.”198 Brumbelow’s mother did contact Mathenia during the
pregnancy and made it clear that Brumbelow was interested in raising
the child.199
Mathenia gave birth to the child and gave the child up for adoption
on the same day. She did not tell Brumbelow she gave birth because she
did not believe it was “her job.”200 Nevertheless, Brumbelow filed his
legitimation petition within a month of learning the child was born and
put up for adoption, but still before he had DNA testing showing he was
the biological father. After the baby was put up for adoption,
Brumbelow and Mathenia even met with an attorney together. During
the meeting, Mathenia stated she desired to revoke the surrender of her
parental rights and co-parent the child with Brumbelow.201 She stated
that “despite initially agreeing to the adoption, she had been ‘on and off’
about going through with it, and that she struggled with making the
decision.”202 Between this meeting and the legitimation hearing,
Mathenia changed her mind and decided she no longer wished to revoke
the surrender of her rights and she wanted to proceed with the
adoption. Brumbelow also requested a visitation of his child through his
attorney.203
Ultimately, the trial court determined that Brumbelow’s “only action
demonstrating any intent to develop a familial bond with the Child was

Brumbelow v. Mathenia, 347 Ga. App. 861, 862, 819 S.E.2d 535, 537 (2018).
Id. at 862, 819 S.E.2d at 537–38.
196 Final Order Denying Pet. for Legitimation, 3:1, June 21, 2017, No. 16CV0608CC.
197 Brumbelow, 347 Ga. App. at 862, 819 S.E.2d at 538.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 863, 819 S.E.2d at 538.
201 Id. at 863–64, 819 S.E.2d at 538–39.
202 Id. at 863, 819 S.E.2d at 538.
203 Id. at 864, 819 S.E.2d at 539.
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the filing of his petition for legitimation; therefore the Court concludes”
that he has abandoned his opportunity interest.”204
On appeal, Presiding Judge Dillard wrote for the Georgia Court of
Appeals and took issue with the trial court’s conclusion that
Brumbelow’s “only action” in support of his opportunity interest was
filing his legitimation petition.205 Specifically, Judge Dillard wrote that
the conclusion was “not only unsupported by the evidence, it is also in
direct conflict with the court's own factual findings.”206 It further
reasoned:
So, while we are required to defer to the trial court's finding that
Brumbelow made no attempts to contact Mathenia during the
remainder of her pregnancy, it is undisputed that Mathenia had
already decided not to have any contact with him. And when, as here,
a biological mother admittedly shows hostility toward the biological
father of her child, cuts off all contact with him, and unequivocally
advises him that she does not want to raise a child with him, we
cannot say—as the trial court's order seems to suggest—that the
biological father's failure to contact or offer financial assistance to the
biological mother during her pregnancy, standing alone, is enough to
constitute an abandonment of his opportunity interest in a
relationship with his child.207

The court of appeals held the trial court did not give “meaningful
consideration” to the fact that Brumbelow did not delay in filing his
legitimation petition.208 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest and
remanded to determine if he was a fit parent.209
The case was appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. The supreme
court decided that the appellate court conducted an improper review of
the facts of the case because it analyzed evidence that was not included
in the superior court’s order.210 The court of appeals relied on its ability

Final Order, supra note 197, at 5–6 (emphasis added).
Brumbelow, 347 Ga. App. at 868–69, 819 S.E.2d at 542.
206 Id. at 868–69, 819 S.E.2d at 542. The trial court factual findings included: (1)
Brumbelow attended a doctor’s appointment with Mathenia, (2) Brumbelow offered to pay
for an abortion “if she wanted one,” (3) Brumbelow’s mother contacted Mathenia about
meeting with the attorney, and (4) Brumbelow requested visitation through his attorney
at least once. Final Order, supra note 197, at 3.
207 Id. at 871, 819 S.E.2d at 544.
208 Id. at 869, 819 S.E.2d at 542.
209 Id. at 879, 819 S.E.2d at 547–48.
210 Mathenia, 208 Ga. at 715, 843 S.E.2d at 585.
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to consider undisputed facts that the trial court did not consider.211 But,
the supreme court disagreed and held that “appellate courts cannot use
those undisputed facts to make alternative findings of fact that are
contrary to those explicit or implicitly made by the trial court where
other evidence exists that supports the trial courts findings.”212
Nonetheless, as Justice Peterson stated in the dissent, the undisputed
facts were “merely contrary to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that
the father abandoned his opportunity interest.”213
Regardless, the Georgia Supreme Court limited its discussion to
what the trial court wrote in its order.214 The court noted that the trial
court did recognize there was not a delay in filing his legitimation
petition.215 But, the court found it only “slightly moved” him on the
scale from being the kind of father who has no relationship with his
child to one that wants more than just a biological connection.216
The supreme court also emphasized that Brumbelow offered to pay
for Mathenia to have an abortion.217 It stated this offer was the only
financial support he gave her, and it “indicated that Brumbelow wanted
no relationship at all with [the child], as an abortion would have
ensured that no relationship could ever develop.”218 The supreme court
stated that supporting Mathenia during her pregnancy financially and
emotionally was a significant way he could have pursued his
opportunity interest.219 The court differentiated this case from Bowers
and decided that Mathenia did not prevent the Brumbelow from
developing a relationship despite his “clear desire to do so.”220 Based on
these reasons, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals reversal
of the denial of Brumbelow’s legitimation petition.221
When the court of appeals affirmed the supreme court’s decision,
Judge Dillard wrote a concurrence dubitante222 where he stated simply,

Id. at 728, 843 S.E.2d at 593 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 716 n.3, 843 S.E.2d at 585.
213 Id. at 728, 843 S.E.2d at 593 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 716, 843 S.E.2d at 585.
215 Id. at 721, 843 S.E.2d at 588.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 721, 843 S.E.2d at 588–89.
219 Id. at 721–22, 843 S.E.2d at 589.
220 Id. at 722, 843 S.E.2d at 589.
221 Id. at 726, 843 S.E.2d at 592.
222 Brumbelow v. Mathenia, No. A18A1117, 2021 WL 633382, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb.
17, 2021) (Dillard, J., concurring dubitante) (“A concurrence dubitante is a concurrence
that is given doubtfully.”)
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“I concur because my oath requires that I do so.”223 His concurrence
dubitante was succinct yet forceful. He made clear that he believed the
Georgia Supreme Court “significantly diminished the constitutional
rights of unwed biological fathers in Georgia.”224 He stated in instances
where a mother cuts off communication with the biological father, the
father is left with two choices: “harassing (to the point of stalking) the
biological mother or forfeiting his opportunity interest.”225 He went on
to say that although some may be in favor of such a “catch-22 because it
is good for business,” he most certainly is not.226
A. Analysis of Mathenia: Does This Seem Right?
In Mathenia, a father got a married woman pregnant during a onenight stand. There was no previous relationship between the two. The
woman admittedly did not want anything to do with the father. The
father backed off. But then, the mother gave the child up for adoption
without letting the father know the child was even born. Then, the
father and mother met with an attorney. While there, the mother
agreed to revoke her consent to adopt and help the father have parental
rights to the child. She again changed her mind and decided she
actually still wanted to go through with the adoption. Then, the court
still denied the father’s legitimation petition for his inaction during the
pregnancy, and the court granted the adoption.
As shown in Mathenia, according to Georgia case law, a father cannot
safeguard the right to his child by filing a legitimation petition as soon
as the child is born. Clearly Georgia courts are heavily involved in the
granting or denying of legitimation petitions. By filing for legitimation,
the biological father is actively agreeing to assume all responsibilities of
being the child’s legal parent. But, the courts still have discretion to
analyze the father’s actions and decide not to grant the legitimation
petition. So, this makes Lehr’s often quoted line of “[t]he actions of
judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds” seem like a fallacy.227
As much as Mathenia did concern the denial of an unwed father’s
opportunity interest, this case primarily turned on the issue of an

Id.
Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. Judge Dillard also addressed the issue of addressing undisputed facts that were
“admitted to by the mother under oath and ignored by the trial court in its order.” He
stated that the trial court’s job is to resolve “conflicts in the evidence” and it should not be
permitted to “cherry pick some undisputed facts while conveniently ignoring other in
order to achieve some seemingly predetermined result.”
227 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
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appellate court’s role in reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a
legitimation petition. Although Brumbelow did argue that legitimation
petitions in Georgia violate equal protection and due process rights by
favoring adoptive parents of biological parents and therefore depriving
him of his “constitutionally afforded opportunity to form a bond with his
child.”228 Ultimately, the issue was never addressed for lack of the court
of appeals jurisdiction over questions of the constitutionality of laws.229
The question of the constitutionality of denying a legitimation petition
involving a newborn children remains unanswered.
VII. TIME FOR CHANGE OR CLARIFICATION
Society has unquestionably changed significantly in the thirty years
that have passed since the last United State Supreme Court decision
regarding unmarred biological fathers’ rights in 1989.230 What would
happen if a properly presented case concerning unmarried biological
fathers’ rights to their newborn children was presented to the United
States Supreme Court? There is little doubt that the United States
Supreme Court would find this a violation of his opportunistic rights to
his child under current United States Supreme Court precedent. But,
the United States Supreme Court could also set new precedent, given
the change in times, that an unmarried biological father has an
automatic right to his child based on his biology alone.
A. Historic Justifications for Unequal Treatment No Longer Apply
In the United States, the percent of all births to unmarried women
was only 3.8% in 1940,231 and by 2018 the number had risen to 39.6%.232
Specifically in Georgia, 45.1% of births in Georgia were to unmarried
mothers in 2018, which is up 5% from just 2005.233 Actually, today, one
out of every four parents living with a child is not married.234 Needless
to say, the prevalence of children born outside of marriage has grown

Brumbelow, 347 Ga. App. at 865, 819 S.E.2d at 539.
Id.
230 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
231 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Unmarried Childbearing (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/Nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf.
232 National Vital Statistics Reports, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States,
1940-99, 2 (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm.
233 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Percentage of Births to Unmarried
Mothers
by
State
(Oct.
7,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/unmarried/unmarried.htm.
234 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 306 (citing Gretchen Livingston,
The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents, Pew Social Trends (April 25, 2018)).
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considerably over time and will continue to grow. The justifications for
unequal treatment of unmarried biological fathers may have made
sense at the time of the prior United States Supreme Court cases were
decided, but they are no longer adequate justifications in today’s
society.
The preference of children being raised in “normal” and “natural”
families allowed for the State to favor adoption over unwed fathers for
public policy reasons. Marriage still has a strong role in our society and
there is still an idea of “formal” family consisting of a mom, dad and
child. But now, the notion of a formal family is no longer desired for the
child’s sake. Today’s society embraces the idea of non-traditional
families. For example, society does not consider a child to be lesser than
if he or she grows up in the house of two parents of the same sex, even
though years ago, it would have thought to have been not an
appropriate setting for the child. Likewise, now, an unwed father
having partial or complete custody of his child and raising the child on
his own, would not make the child and the father any less of a family.
Society has adapted to understanding that fathers and mothers are
equally capable of raising a child. Gender roles have become more fluid
and less stereotyped.
These days, a child born outside of marriage is not treated unequally
by society simply because his or her parents were not married when he
or she was born. It is almost inconceivable that at one point “bastard”
children were treated as outcasts or were distinguished from other
children at all.
Other reasons for differential treatment were the inability to locate
and identify the father, whereas the mother was present and
identifiable during the birth of the child. Given the access to DNA
testing which are simple and accurate, even if the mother has many
possibilities of who the father is a DNA tests could easily be done. Also,
with the capabilities of technology, it would be naïve to say that the
biological father could not be located. A simple Facebook or Google
search could easily give information needed to locate the father, as long
as the mother had a semblance of an idea who the father was.
In today’s time, these justifications are no longer relevant. And yet,
unmarried biological fathers are still not given equal treatment to
married biological fathers or mothers. As shown in Mathenia, an
unmarried biological father’s legitimation petition after the birth of a
newborn child can be denied—but would be automatic for the mother
and the same father if he was married to the mother. There is no
United States Supreme Court precedent that provides a basis for this
treatment of unmarried biological fathers’ rights to their children, in
fact, precedent suggests this is unconstitutional.
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B. Unconstitutional Under Current Supreme Court Precedent
The denial of an unmarried biological father’s legitimation petition
right after the birth of the child because he has lost his opportunity
interest is unconstitutional. In such a situation, the opportunity
interest is lost before the father has a chance to form any relationship
with his child. This opportunity interest was the only constitutional
right biological fathers were guaranteed by the United States Supreme
Court.
The Court stressed that unmarried biological fathers have a
constitutional right to the. “opportunity . . .to develop a relationship
with his offspring.”235 It never suggests that the right hinges on the
father’s relationship with the mother, which is what a finding of a lost
opportunity interest during pregnancy entails. The encouragement of
the relationship with the mother largely comes from the encouragement
of marriage. In some cases, neither the mother nor the father wants any
form of relationship with each other, and the only common denominator
between the two is the child. The biological father is denied the
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child when his
legitimation petition is denied right after the birth of the child.
Additionally, the father, by filing a legitimation petition, is taking
the proper legal steps to ensure a relationship with his child. The
judicial system in Georgia plays an active role in scrutinizing fathers’
actions and inactions during the pregnancy. Georgia courts do not deem
the filing of a legitimation petition enough to secure an unmarried
biological father’s rights to his newborn child. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court would unlikely find that filing for legitimation
right after the birth of the child constitutes abandoning the child based
on its prior precedent. The Court could reiterate Lehr’s holding that
“[t]he actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.”236 In
other words, the United States Supreme Court would hold that a father
cannot lose his constitutional right to the opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child if no such opportunity ever existed. But, the
United States Supreme Court could also hold that adequate
justifications no longer exist for differentiating between married and
unmarried biological fathers and mothers.
C. New Precedent: Automatic Right Based on Biology Alone
Another option is that the United States Supreme Court could hold
an entirely new precedent that gives unmarried biological fathers
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automatic rights to their child consistent with that of the mothers. This
approach would obviously require a reworking of many state laws,
specifically Georgia’s. Although, other states, like Virginia, already
have state laws fairly consistent with this proposal.237 So, the Supreme
Court could follow Virginia’s approach and further hold that upon a
showing of paternity, the biological father will legally have equal rights
and responsibilities to that of the mother.
State legislation consistent with this hypothetical holding would not
distinguish between a legal father and biological father. Therefore,
paternity would establish parentage which could be ascertained by a
DNA test, signed acknowledgement by the mother and father, or by
being listed on the birth certificate.238 So, all adoptions concerning
newborn children would require the consent of both the biological father
and mother.
Perhaps state law would require the father to be served with notice
of pregnancy during a reasonably time period. The law could also
require the father be served with notice of intent to put the child up for
adoption. He would thereby be informed of his rights to the child. If he
actively chose not to claim those rights by not responding within a
specified period of time, his rights to object to the adoption would be
waived. His paternity rights would be taken from him. The unmarried
biological father’s rights would be terminated in the same way that
parental rights are already terminated by the state.
This approach would allow unmarried biological fathers to have
rights that could be lost, and also give the mother time to plan for
adoption if needed. But, it would also safeguard the father’s rights from
situations like Mathenia where the father was fighting for rights to his
child and the mother was able to unilaterally put the child up for
adoption.
The United States Supreme Court holding a new precedent on
unmarried biological fathers’ rights would be monumental, but not
altogether surprising. The numerous dissenting opinions in the major
Supreme Court cases in Part IV illustrate how controversial the subject
was even 30 years ago. Perhaps, America is ready for equal treatment
of married and unmarried biological fathers and mothers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unmarried fathers’ rights have not been analyzed by the United
States Supreme Court in over 30 years. Since then, times have
See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1202 (C); Va. Code Ann. § 20-49.1 (B)(1).
This proposal would obviously require exceptions in instances of adoption,
surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, etc.
237
238

2021]

BIOLOGY IS NOT DESTINY

655

undoubtedly changed. Children are increasingly being born to parents
who are not married at the time of the children’s birth. Society no
longer stigmatizes the “Jon Snows” of the world for being “bastards.”
But still, unmarried fathers are denied an automatic right to their
children simply for their marital status. The Georgia Supreme Court
case of Mathenia exemplified the relevance of unmarried biological
fathers’ rights in today’s society.
The question raised by Mathenia is as follows. Should unmarried
biological fathers be given only the opportunity to develop a
relationship with their child? If yes, should this opportunity interest be
deemed lost when a legitimation petition is filed immediately after the
birth of the child? These questions remain unanswered. It is only a
matter of time until the constitutionality of unequal treatment of
unmarried fathers and mothers is scrutinized again. Actually, if the
United States Supreme Court held new groundbreaking precedent for
an unmarried biological father to have an automatic constitutionally
protected interest in his child, I believe most of America would be
surprised that was not already the law.
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